

2017

Gandhara Research
Society, Pakistan

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Gandhara Journal of Research in Social Science

ISSN: 2415-2404

Volume 2, No. 3, Winter 2017



POVERTY AND TERRORISM IN NIGERIAN: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

The main purpose of this paper is to ascertain the existence (or not) of a relationship between poverty and terrorism in Nigeria from 1970 to 2015. Human development index was used as a measure of poverty to examine the relationship. Dickey-Fuller, Phillips-Perron and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin unit root tests were carried out. The result of the test showed that the variables are integrated of order one. The estimation technique is the OLS and the result reveals a positive and significant relationship between poverty and terrorism. A plausible explanation for this result is that the well-being of Nigerians has not really improved despite the fact that Nigeria is Africa's largest oil producer and her economy has recorded a rising growth in its GDP especially over the last decades. Instead poverty has increased and of course, culminating into terrorism. This paper recommends that government should ensure that growth is accompanied by a deliberate policy of redistribution and equity. In this direction, broad-based growth that provides social services and infrastructure aimed at reducing the depth and severity of poverty across the country must be pursued in the bid to reduce terrorism.



POVERTY AND TERRORISM IN NIGERIAN: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

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1. Introduction

The Nigerian economy naturally endowed with immense wealth, still found a substantial portion of its population still in poverty. During the last three decades the country earned over US\$300 billion from crude oil alone (Akanbi and Du Toit, 2010). Today, this should have transformed into a huge socio-economic development of the country. Instead, Nigeria's basic social indicators now place her as one of the 25 poorest countries in the world (Akanbi and Du Toit, 2010). The Nigerian economy has recorded a rising growth in its GDP especially over the last decades. But this has not translated into accelerated employment and reduction in poverty among its citizens. This development has also been the case for most African countries. The endowment of crude oil can be seen as the major factor fueling the economic growth. It is however expected that the oil revenue should spread to the rest of the economy leading to a higher shared income for the owners of factors of production.

Nigeria's poor have recently made headlines since the contents of a troubling report on the country's economic development were made public. Despite the country's years of strong GDP growth, Nigeria's national statistics bureau estimates that 2010 saw a sharp increase in the number of Nigerians who considered themselves poor (about 94% of survey respondents). The percentage of Nigerians living on a dollar-a-day or less also grew to more than 60% in 2010, 10% higher than the last study six years before (Seitz, 2012). Violent attacks by Boko Haram and other militant groups are also in the news, and it did not take long for observers to claim a causal relationship. Former US President Bill Clinton drew such a conclusion several days ago, saying that: "You can't just have this level of inequality persist. That's what's fueling all this stuff" (Seitz, 2012).

The 'inequality-causes-violence' explanation of separatist movements and terrorist attacks is certainly intuitively appealing. The Northern and Northeastern regions of Nigeria are both the poorest by many measures and home to several militant groups (Seitz, 2012). The aim of this paper is to empirically investigate whether terrorism in Nigeria is rooted in poverty. The



remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The next section provides a review of literature, while section 3 presents some stylized facts on poverty, terrorism and performance of the Nigerian economy. Section 4 explains the estimation model and data source. The empirical results are reported in section 5. Section 6 gives the conclusion and policy implications.

2. Literature Review

Terrorism is not unique to the modern era. The terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorists’ date back to the eighteenth century (Lacquer, 1987), Prior to the 1960s, most terrorist activity was localized. It was either confined within a specific geographical jurisdiction or limited to certain regions. However, the rapid advances in transportation and communication technology associated with globalization have brought about a shift in the nature and scale of the terrorist threat.

There are some academic work backing the theory that poverty or inequality leads to more effective organized violence. Efraim Benmelech, Claude Berrebi and Esteban F. Klor (2010) for example used data from attacks against Israeli targets to suggest that: “Poor economic conditions may lead more able, better-educated individuals to participate in terror attacks, allowing terror organizations to send better-qualified terrorists to more complex, higher-impact, terror missions. The results in Alesina et al (1996) suggest that poor economic conditions increase the probability of political coups. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) show that economic variables are powerful predictors of civil war, while political variables have low explanatory power. Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004) show that, for a sample of African countries, negative exogenous shocks in economic growth increase the likelihood of civil conflict. Because terrorism is a manifestation of political conflict, these results seem to indicate that poverty and adverse economic conditions may play an important role explaining terrorism (Abadie, 2004).

However, recent empirical studies have challenged the view that poverty creates terrorism. Using U.S. State Department data on transnational terrorist attacks, Krueger and Laitin (2003) and Piazza (2006) find no evidence suggesting that poverty may generate terrorism. In particular, the results in Krueger and Laitin (2003) suggest that among countries with similar levels of civil liberties, poor countries do not generate more terrorism than rich countries. Conversely, among countries with similar levels of civil liberties, richer countries seem to be preferred targets for transnational terrorist attacks.

The literature reviewed showed interesting results but the effect of poverty on terrorism is still not conclusive. This paper focuses on home grown terrorism in Nigeria. This is because of the country country-specific characteristic which is sometimes described as “poverty in the mist of plenty”.

3. Overview of Nigeria: Economy, Poverty and Terrorism

Nigeria's economy has been described as a dual economy with a modern segment dependent on oil earnings, overlaid by a traditional agricultural and trading economy (Thomas and Canagarajah, 2002). At independence in 1960 agriculture accounted for well over half of GDP, and was the main source of export earnings and public revenue. The oil sector, which emerged in the 1960's and was firmly established during the 1970's, is now of overwhelming importance to the point of overdependence: it provides 20% of GDP, 95% of foreign exchange earnings, and about 65% of budgetary revenues (Dutse, 2008). Table 1 in Appendix provides a picture of Nigeria's economic performance from 1999-2001; some macroeconomic indicators, from 2003 to 2007 are shown in Table 2 (see Appendix) and projected quarterly growth rates for the period 2013- 2016 is presented in Table 3. The largely subsistence agricultural sector has not kept up with rapid population growth, and Nigeria, once a large net exporter, now imports food. Based on GNP per capita, Nigeria is among the world's 20 poorest countries (Dutse, 2008).

Nigeria's economic growth since the early 1970's has been erratic, driven primarily by the fluctuations of the global oil market. During the 1980's and 1990's, the country faced growing economic decline and falling living standards, a reflection also of political instability, corruption, and poor macroeconomic management exhibit by failure to diversify the economy (Dutse, 2008).

Despite impressive growth since democratization (in 1999), poverty levels remain unacceptably high. The poverty rate is currently estimated to be about 54.4%, a slight improvement from the peak of 66.9% registered in 1996 (Okojie, 2002). Nevertheless, poverty is at double the rate that it was in 1980, when the poverty level was 27.1% (British Council Nigeria, 2012). Table 4 below shows poverty levels in Nigeria. Table 5 in Appendix shows 2010 poverty numbers for absolute, relative, dollar/day and food poverty.

Table 4 shows poverty levels in Nigeria between 1980 and 2010, by region.

Table 1: Indicative poverty trends by region. Nigeria.

Level	1980	1985	1992	1996	2004	2010
National	28.1	46.3	42.7	65.6	54.4	69
Sector						
Urban	17.2	37.8	37.5	58.2	43.2	61.8
Rural	28.3	51.4	66.0	69.3	63.3	73.2
Geopolitical zone						
South-South	13.2	45.7	40.8	58.2	35.1	63.8
South-East	12.9	30.4	41.0	53.5	26.7	67
South-West	13.4	38.6	43.1	60.9	43.0	59.1
North-Central	32.2	50.8	46.0	64.7	67.0	67.5
North-East	35.6	54.9	54.0	70.1	72.2	76.3
North-West	37.7	52.1	36.5	77.2	71.2	77.7

Source: British Council Nigeria (2012)

Although the data are not directly comparable across the years owing to differences in the way they were collected, they indicate the presence of a consistent North-South divide. Some, like Bello and Roslan (2010), have argued that this pattern can be explained in part by the fact that the North's economy is predominantly agricultural and that particularly low returns from rural enterprises condemn the region to poverty.

Table 6 shows that people working in the agricultural sector are more likely to live in poverty. This is consistent across all years. The reasons why agriculture in Africa is often associated with poverty are many and varied, but for Nigeria low wages, the poor productivity of land and labour, and depressed commodity prices are often cited, combined with shortages of land, labour and capital (World Bank, 2008). Low productivity in the agricultural sector, where female labour predominates, contributes to the poverty of the rural population, making Nigerians more dependent on food imports and less able to withstand external or other shocks.

Table 6: Poverty head count by occupation of head of Household in Nigeria

Sector	Poverty headcount by year				
	1980	1985	1992	1996	2004
Professional & technical	17.3	35.6	35.7	51.8	34.2
Administration	45	25.3	22.3	33.5	45.3
Clerical & related	10	29.1	34.4	60.1	39.2
Sales workers	15	36.6	33.5	56.7	44.2
Service industry	21.3	38	38.2	71.4	43
Agricultural & forestry	31.5	53.5	47.9	71	67
Production & transport	23.2	46.6	40.8	65.8	42.5
Manufacturing & processing	12.4	31.7	33.2	49.4	44.2
Others	1.5	36.8	42.8	61.2	49.1
Student & apprentices	15.6	40.5	41.8	52.4	41.6
Total	27.2	46.3	42.7	65.6	54.4



Source: British Council Nigeria (2012)

The failure of agriculture in Nigeria is often blamed on the federal system; with the central government planning ignored or by passed by regional governments. What is clear, however, that as the agriculture industry has declined decade after decade, the ability to provide food for the family and sell on the excess has diminished year by year, fuelling poverty in Nigeria and of course, malnutrition.

Malnutrition affects just under a third of all Nigerian children, one in five of whom die before their fifth birthday, HIV/AIDS affects three out of every hundred citizens and there are nearly ten million orphans in the country out of a total population of 162 million ~ making it the eighth most populous nation in the world NMI (2013). Life expectancy is around 53 years NMI (2013). Unfortunately the land for farming is suffering from deforestation and soil erosion in the north due to poor farming methods and in the Niger Delta Region, land is becoming increasingly polluted by oil spills and also suffers from regular, heavy flooding. Table 7 in Appendix shows an overview of poverty and other related indicators in the country

The contemporary Nigeria has become a theatre of genocide, bloodshed and insecurity over the past years due to the carnage activities of terrorist groups. Terrorists of various groups and camps unleash havoc on the Nigerian populace. Though these groups are numerous, the most noticeable and deadly are the Boko Haram sect and Niger Delta Militants (Chinwokwu, 2012). There is a conflicting body of literature over the horrible acts of these terrorist groups. Table 8 in Appendix presents cases of domestic terrorism arising from bomb explosions in Nigeria 1986-2015. See also in Appendix for images of terrorism in Nigeria.

4. Estimation Model and Data Source

Most studies on the causes and effects of terrorism have relied on measures of terrorist casualties or terrorist incidents as proxies for the level of terrorist risk. Frey (2004) and others have questioned the quality and adequacy of the available data on terrorist casualties and incidents. Due to issue of data inconsistency, reliability and availability on terrorist casualties and incidents, in this paper, a chronological data on terrorism incidents in Nigeria use to show



the occurrence of terrorism and it is the dependent variable. The dummy variable is constructed using binary. It takes the value of 1 if terrorist attack occurs in a year and 0 if otherwise.

To estimate the impact of poverty on terrorism the following basic specification is used:

$$TERR = \alpha + \beta \ln(HDI) + \Psi' \pi + \Phi \dots \dots \dots (1)$$

Where TERR = terrorism (dummy variable)

HDI = human development index (proxy for poverty)

Ψ = a vector which includes other related indicators of poverty

Φ = the residual term.

To measure poverty the Human Development Index was used. The Human Development Index measures the well-being of the inhabitants of a country along three different dimensions: health, education, and income. It is constructed using country data on life expectancy at birth, adult literacy and school enrollment ratio, and GDP per capita. The Human Development Index (HDI) has a 0-1 potential range. In some regressions, instead of using HDI, GDP per capita, or Gini Index were used. The Gini Index is a widely-used measure of income or consumption inequality. The potential range of the Gini Index is 0-100, a value of zero meaning perfect equality. The vector Ψ includes other related indicators of poverty and potential predictors of terrorism such as measures of discomfort (inflation rate + unemployment rate), population living in absolute poverty. The annual data covers the period 1970 to 2015. The choice of this period was guided by data availability considerations. The data were obtained from the publication of Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin, journals, newspapers and websites. Most of the variables in equation 1 are transformed into logarithm to facilitate easy estimation. The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) is used as the estimation technique.

This technique is based on some assumptions which make the OLS estimators to become Blue (Best linear Unbiased Estimator) (Gujarati, 2003). Some of the short comings of the OLS method include the fact that while some of its assumptions are unrealistic and a single model cannot fully satisfy all the assumptions at a time. Also, no single test can solve all the problems of this method at a time. Hence, there is need to apply individual initiative alongside the empirical rules and tests so as to obtain tenable and robust results. In the light of that, the method

of OLS is used but the autocorrelation is corrected by a first-order autoregressive (AR) error term.

5. Empirical Results

Table 9 in Appendix show the descriptive statistics used to evaluate the mean, median, mode, standard deviation, variances, skewness, range, maximum and minimum of terrorism (TERR), human development index (HDI), GDP per capita (GDPC), gini index (GINI), discomfort (DIN), population living in absolute poverty (APVL). Mean values of TERR, GINI, DIN, GDPC, APVL and HDI is derived as 0.767442, 40.69558, 26.12140, 540.9800, 45.50698 and 0.396093 respectively. Similarly, the standard deviation is given as 0.427463, 3.013164, 15.20818, 493.6716, 24.38921 and 0.076373 respectively. Kurtosis, Jarque-Bera and other description values of these variables are given in Table 8 (see Appendix).

Figure 1 in Appendix shows the correlogram. It displays the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions up to 20 orders of lags. These functions characterize the pattern of temporal dependence in the time series. The dotted lines in the plots of the autocorrelations and partial autocorrelation are the approximate two standard error bounds computed as $\pm 2/(\sqrt{T})$. If the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation are within these bounds, they are not significantly different from zero at (approximately) the 5% significance level. Figure 1 shows that the autocorrelation (AC) is significantly different from zero up to the 6 lag, thereafter, it fell within two standard error bounds all through to the 20 lag. The partial autocorrelation (PC) was significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level in the 1 lag and 11 lag. At other order of lags it was not significantly different from zero as it stayed within the two standard bounds.

The analysis continues by investigating the unit root properties of the respective variables using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (DF, 1979), Phillips-Perron (PP, 1988), and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS, 1992) unit root tests. The ADF and PP unit roots are based on the null hypothesis that the respective time series are difference stationary while the KPSS unit root test is based on the null hypothesis of trend stationarity. From Table 10 in Appendix, the specifications of the ADF and PP unit root tests with a constant as well as a constant and trend

indicate that variables are integrated of order one. However, the results for the KPSS unit root tests are quite diverse. Indeed, the unit root tests indicate varying orders of integration.

The estimation results of the model in equation 1 are reported in Table 11 (see Appendix). The goodness of fit of the regression is high (0.802251 or 80.2%) and the joint significance of the explanatory variables is impressive (F-statistic-52.74; statistically significant at 1% level). However, this basic model is not an appropriate model for statistical inference, because of the small value of the DW-statistic which shows the presence of serial correlation and aligns with the correlogram test. Hence, an AR(1) model is presented in Table 12. Note that this model has a high DW- statistic of 1.783446 compared to a very low value of 0.537729 for the basic regression model in Table 11. This is now presented in Table 13 alongside other regressions using GDP per capita and gini index as measures of poverty instead. From column (1) in Table 13 we can see that the coefficient of the log of human development index is statistically significant at the 1% level. It shows that a positive significant relationship with terrorism. Meaning that a unit rise in HDI leads to 1.22 units increase in terrorism. The implication is that as poverty (proxy by HDI) increases so also is terrorism. This is contrary to a priori expectation.

A plausible explanation for this result is that the well-being of Nigerians has not really improved despite the fact that Nigeria is Africa's largest oil producer and her economy has recorded a rising growth in its GDP especially over the last decades. Nigeria's economy is struggling to leverage the country's vast wealth in fossil fuels in order to displace the crushing poverty (DoubleGist.com, 2013). Over 65% of the country's population lives under the poverty line and half of those live in abject poverty. That's 80 million people (NMI, 2013). Part of this is because of rampant corruption in urban areas and the ongoing failure of repeated poverty eradication programs to address the poverty issue. Few funds allocated to poverty campaigns have trickled down to the masses due to inefficiency, lack of knowledge and corruption, leaving the 90% of the rural community to rely on subsistence farming with almost half struggling to make a living on smallholdings barely one hectare in size (NMI, 2013).

In Table 13, column 2 is a specification that excludes LOG(HDI) and includes the gini index (LOG(GINI)) as an explanatory variable. It reveals that LOG(GINI) is statistically insignificant. This statistical insignificance is also exhibited when gross domestic product per

capita (GDPC) is used as a measure of poverty among the explanatory variables in column 3 specification. Still from Table 13, the estimates suggest that other related indicators of poverty such as measures of discomfort (inflation rate + unemployment rate) (LOG(DIN)), population living in absolute poverty (LOG(APVL)) have consistently been positive but not statistically different from zero at conventional test levels in all the specifications in column 1, 2 and 3.

6. Conclusion and Policy Implications

This paper empirically examines the relationship between poverty and terrorism in Nigeria. This paper uses annual data for the period 1970-2015 collected from the Central Bank of Nigeria statistical bulletin, journals, newspapers and websites. Following a detailed time series analysis, the findings reveal a positive and significant relationship between poverty and terrorism. A plausible explanation for this result is that the well-being of Nigerians has not really improved despite the fact that Nigeria is Africa's largest oil producer and her economy has recorded a rising growth in its GDP especially over the last decades. Instead poverty has increased and of course, culminating into terrorism. Also, the regression estimates suggest that apart from human development index, other related indicators of poverty have not been statistically different from zero at conventional test levels. There is need for a more advanced econometric test such as the Johansen VAR estimation technique which will give a more robust empirical test with a view to having a better understanding of the positive relationship between poverty and terrorism in Nigeria. In addition, the model used above should be expanded to accommodate more explanatory variables.

At this juncture, this paper suggests that attention should be focused on those macro and microeconomic policies and programmes which would ensure the rapid growth of the economic. Economic growth is crucial in efforts aimed at conquering poverty as it would generate income earning opportunities for the poor, make job creation possible, and thereby make use of their most abundant asset labour. However, economic growth alone is not sufficient for poverty reduction. Therefore, growth must be accompanied by a deliberate policy of redistribution and equity, promoted by participation (Obadan, n.d). In this direction, broad-based growth that provides social services and infrastructure aimed at reducing the depth and severity of poverty across the country is required.

In the bid to achieve poverty reduction through public spending, the annual budget by the federal government should be considered with utmost care so as to enhance the adequate funding of the agricultural sector since this sector employs many people that are poor. More precisely, the funds should be channeled to farm mechanization. This will help create employment and boost food production, thereby reducing poverty. In the same vein, allocation of a reasonable percent of lending by commercial banks to the agricultural sector will go a long way in reducing poverty which in turn reduces terrorism.

The issue of good governance that has eluded the nation and corruption that has ruined the nation's economy should also be addressed. When good governance is allowed to thrive civil and economic liberties that are essential for individual initiative and development would be enhanced (Ijaiya et al., 2011). Similarly, with good governance, the rulers will be able to provide necessary opportunities to the poor including social services, employment and security and information that will permit accountability, transparency and openness which in the long run would help increase economic growth, reduce poverty and eventually reduce terrorism.

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